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SHAKESPEARE, SELF-DECEPTION, AND THE MORAL PLAY0 
John D. Cox 
All other swindlers upon earth are nothing to the self-
swindlers, and with such pretenses did I cheat 
myself.-Great Expectations (1861) 
Self-deception came of age as a way of understanding Shakespeare 
with the advent of postmodemism. As Paul Ricoeur points out, 
Descartes's "modem" affirmation of consciousness through rational 
analysis eventually led to the doubting of consciousness by Marx, 
Freud, and Nietzsche, who favored "postmodern" analyses of 
economics, the self, and the history of philosophy ( especially ethics) 
that privileged unconscious motivation over rational deliberation 
(Ricoeur 32-36). The latter was too easily tricked or deceived by the 
former to be trustworthy, so patterns of self-trickery or self-deceit were 
more important to identify than logical argumentation. "False 
consciousness" is Engels's term for such a pattern, and the phrase 
nicely conceptualizes the difference between the real self, which 
motivates social action, and the false self that denies what the real self 
is up to--a denial believed even ( or especially) by the person involved. 
So fruitful is this central insight of postmodern analysis that it has 
become the basic hermeneutical assumption in most writing about 
Shakespeare in the last thirty years, since it provides the under! ying 
rationale for "reading against the grain." What I want to suggest in this 
essay is that self-deception has a history (or as Nietzsche might call it, a 
"genealogy") that postmodern understanding of self-deception has 
largely, if not entirely, ignored, and that this history includes the Tudor 
"moral play."1 Recognizing the medieval genealogy of self-deception 
not only sheds new light on Shakespeare but also clarifies where we 
find ourselves in the ongoing enterprise of understanding his plays. 
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I. Self-Division and Self-Deception in the Moral Play 
Crucial to seeing continuity between pre- and postmodern 
conceptions of self-deception is the seemingly obvious point, observed 
by others, that self-deception necessarily depends on a conception of 
the self as divided (Fingarette 85-91 ). Whether it is a false self and a 
real self or a conscious self and a subconscious self, one part of the 
same person is imagined as deceiving another part, and for this to 
happen, the self needs to be divided, so to speak, against itself, with one 
part suppressing ( or as Freud would say repressing) another. The idea 
of self-division, however, did not originate in the nineteenth century, 
when the three forefathers of postmodemism all lived and wrote. Much 
earlier ideas about the divided self arose in late antiquity and remained 
influential well into the modem era. The apostle Paul famously 
describes himself as divided: "For I alowe not that which I do: for what 
I wolde, that I do not: but what I hate, that do I" ( Geneva Bible, Rom. 
7.15), and perhaps the most thoughtful and influential development of 
Paul's insight appears in Augustine's Confessions, where self-division 
also involves self-deception. 2 Describing the process of his conversion 
to Christianity, Augustine says to God: 
You were wrenching me back toward myself, and pulling me 
round from that standpoint behind my back which I had taken 
to avoid looking at myself. You set me down before my face, 
forcing me to mark how despicable I was, how misshapen and 
begrimed, filthy and festering. (197-98) 
What Augustine construes in this passage as his "true" self is not the 
unconscious motive, as it is for postmodern thinkers, but rather the self 
that he willfully created by distorting the self that God had created him 
to become. Having brought this "despicable" self into being, Augustine 
had hidden it behind his back, to use his own figure of speech, or to use 
more familiar terms, he had suppressed it beneath his conscious mind, 
which assured him he was smart and successful in his commitment to 
daring ideas and a patrician career. In other words, he had deceived 
himself: "! had been aware of it all along, but I had been glossing over 
it, suppressing it and forgetting" (198). Ancient and postmodern 
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thinkers use different metaphors for acting as if part of the self does not 
exist, but both understand self-deception as dependent on self-division. 
The early Christian perception of self-division reached 
Shakespeare in numerous forms. An obvious one is the Elizabethan · 
Book of Common Prayer, which follows Cranmer's version of the 
General Confession, used twice daily, once in every morning and 
evening service (49). Cranmer's prayer virtually paraphrases Paul's 
theology of the self in Romans 7.8-25, as is clear in the prayer's central 
admission: "We have left undone those things which we ought to have 
done, and we have done those things which we ought not to have done, 
and there is no health in us" (50). Recent speculation links Augustine's 
Soliloquies, written as explorations of interiority before the 
Corifessions, to the popular pseudo-Augustinian St. Augustine's 
Soliloquies and its possible influence on the soliloquies of Hamlet 
(Staykova). For a late-sixteenth-century English dramatist, however, 
the most influential vehicle for notions of the divided self came from 
the moral play, with its well-established debt to Prudentius's 
Psychomachia (Spivack 60-95). A slightly older contemporary of 
Augustine, Prudentius also followed Paul in imagining the self as 
divided, but he wrote a pseudo-epic poem about spiritual warfare 
between virtues and vices battling for possession of the soul, rather 
than a philosophical dialogue like Augustine's.' Though Prudentius 
was far from realizing the sophisticated interiority of Augustine, 
Prudentius's way of imagining self-division was, if anything, more 
influential than Augustine's. 
Self-division all but defines the moral play, as the principal 
character confronts aspects of himself ( or of herself, in the case of 
Anima in the fifteenth-century play called Wisdom), as separate 
characters in the play, inclining now to the worse part, now to the 
better, as Augustine does in the Confessions.• But the self is not 
autonomous in the moral play, because original sin requires the 
assistance of divine grace in the form of a character with more than 
human qualities, variously called Mercy, Charity, Perseverance, Good 
Hope, or Wisdom, depending on the play in question. These redemptive 
characters are not imagined as aspects of the self but enter the play to 
restore the better parts of the self to their proper function-in effect, to 
take the despicable self from behind the selfs back, in Augustine's 
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image, so the self can see what it has become. As a character called 
Adversity says of John Skelton's title character, Magnificence, in his 
downfall: 
This lose! was a lord and lived at his lust; 
And now like a lurden he lieth in the dust. 
He knew not himself, his heart was so high; 
Now is there no man that will set by him a fly. 
(1887-90, my emphasis) 
Skelton's description of Magnificence in his despair amounts to 
recognition of moral self-deception: Magnificence thought he knew 
himself, but in thinking so, he deceived himself. "He knew not himself, 
his heart was so high."5 Among moral plays, Magnificence is 
particularly important for Shakespeare, because it was available in 
print, having been published by John Rastell in 1530. Shakespeare 
seems not merely to have known it but to have been so impressed by it 
that he took from it a specific plot device that he used in plays as 
diverse as Two Gentlemen of Verona, 2 Henry VI, Richard III, Much 
Ado about Nothing, Othello, and King Lear. 6 
2. Twelfth Night 
Where self-division and self-deception are concerned, 
Shakespeare's debt to the moral play can be illustrated in three very 
different plays from his mid to late career: Twelfth Night, Julius 
Caesar, and Othello, the last of which is a particularly useful play in 
contrasting classical and early Christian ideas of self-deception with 
their postmodern counterpart. Twelfth Night imagines the protagonist's 
self as divided between two other characters in the play. The Lady 
Olivia's household includes two servants with suggestively symbolic 
names, Feste and Malvolio. They are clearly distinguished characters 
apart from her, but they are rivals for her attention in a way that is 
strongly reminiscent of the earlier moral play, insofar as they appeal to 
opposing tendencies in Olivia herself. Committed to ostentatious 
mourning because of her brother's death, Olivia initially rejects Feste: 
"Go to, you're a dry fool. I'll no more of you" (1.5.38). 7 Feste succeeds 
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in drawing her out of her sober mood, however, and when Malvolio 
objects to Feste, Olivia reproves Malvolio: "O, you are sick of self-
love, Malvolio, and taste with a distempered appetite" (1.5.87-88). At 
just the point when Olivia is back in a mood to favor him-"Where's 
Malvolio? He is sad and civil, I And suits well for a servant with my 
fortunes" (3.4.5-6)-Malvolio's fellow servants play a delicious trick 
on him to make him think Olivia is in love with him. When Malvolio 
appears, he has therefore transformed himself according to her 
supposed instructions into the opposite of what she wishes for in him, 
and she thinks he has fallen victim to what she calls "very midsummer 
madness," ordering him into the care of the same characters who had 
tricked him in the first place (3.4.57-65). 
Establishing Olivia's self-division as imagined by means of two 
other characters is important for understanding how self-deception 
works in Twelfth Night. When Olivia tells Malvolio that he is "sick of 
self-love," she seems to recognize in him something that she fails to 
recognize in herself: that she is sick of self-love, and that what she is 
really drawn to in Malvolio is precisely this quality. Her self-love is 
manifest in her determination to remain in mourning for seven years, 
refusing to engage the world and thus committing herself, in effect, to 
solipsism, sterility, and death, as Feste suggests in his satirical song, 
"Come away, come away death" (2.4.51-66), with its cloying imagery 
and mocking self-pity. At the same time, however, Olivia is young, 
rich, and eminently eligible, as she quickly reveals by falling in love 
with Orsino's messenger, Cesario. Thinking she knows herself as a 
dutifully grieving sister, she both knows and does not know that she is 
young, passionate, and eager for a suitor. In short, she is self-deceived, 
and her mourning attire is the symbol of her ambivalence. As David 
Bevington facetiously remarks, "She must know that she looks 
stunning in black" (Introduction 334). 
Shakespeare clarifies Olivia's self-deception by creating a parallel 
character, Viola, who also loses a brother to death (or so she believes), 
but who immediately collects herself and recognizes the necessity to 
move on with her life, determining to take service with Orsino in order 
to recover her fortunes if she can. Viola, in short, is not self-deceived. 
She is the first person in the play to address the discrepancy between 
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behavior and inner character, when she speaks to the captain who 
rescued her: 
... though that nature with a beauteous wall 
Doth oft close in pollution, yet of thee 
I will believe thou hast a mind that suits 
With this thy fair and outward character. (1.2.48-51) 
Her decision to adopt a false appearance for herself immediately 
follows and seems even to be inspired by what she has just said to the 
sea captain. The contrast between witting and unwitting "disguise" 
(self-concealment and self-deception) is thus made clear. Strategic self-
concealment is what we see in Viola and Feste; self-deception, in 
Orsino and Olivia from the main plot and in Malvolio from the subplot. 
Neither strategy concerning the self is completely satisfactory for 
dealing with the world, Twelfth Night suggests, but they are clearly 
contrasted in their deliberateness and self-ignorance, respectively. 
Paralleling Viola in the subplot is Feste, who is the second 
character, after her, to observe the discrepancy between outer 
appearance and inner reality: "cucul/us non facit monachum; that's as 
much as to say as I wear not motley in my brain" (1.5.52-54). His point 
is that he is not the fool he appears to be. Since he says this when he is 
in the process of proving that Olivia herself is a fool for mourning 
excessively, his implication is that she is not what she appears to be as 
well-that is, wise, self-knowing, and appropriately devoted to grief. 
He thus penetrates her self-deception and successfully (at least for a 
moment) enables her to see Malvolio for what he is and thus potentially 
to see herself for what she is. As Feste uses his folly as a stalking horse 
for his wit, so Viola uses masculine disguise as a stalking horse for her 
courtship of Orsino, and Olivia's falling in love with Viola disguised as 
Cesario is what eventually brings Olivia out of her self-deception and 
self-preoccupation. 
To be sure, the divided and deceived self that Shakespeare 
explores in Twelfth Night has more to do with romantic self-fulfillment 
than with moral self-recognition and the acknowledgment of divine 
grace. It is therefore easier and more appealing to refer the play 
forward, so to speak, to Freud than backward to medieval drama, 
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especially to the moral play, which seems schematic, one-dimensional, 
and-let us face it-moralistic.' Rejecting Shakespeare's native 
tradition, however, in favor of something more fashionable is a move 
that Shakespeare refused to make himself, not only in the oft-cited 
Chorus of Time in The Winter's Tale (4.l) but in Twelj/h Night as 
well.9 As if in response to reservations about his native dramatic 
heritage, Shakespeare lets us know unequivocally that the moral play 
was on his mind when he wrote Twelj/h Night, because he alludes to 
it----.,ven suggesting some kind of audience need for it (italicized 
below)--in the ditty Feste sings after farcically attempting to exorcise 
Malvolio for his madness: 
3. Julius Caesar 
I am gone, sir, 
And anon, sir, 
I'll be with you again, 
In a trice, 
Like to the old Vice, 
Your need to sustain; 
Who, with dagger of lath, 
In his rage and his wrath, 
Cries, "Aha!" to the devil; 
Like a mad lad, 
"Pare thy nails, dad? 
Adieu, goodman devil!" 
(4.2.121-32, my emphasis)'° 
Moreover, and more importantly, Shakespeare imagined self-
deception without reference to sexual motivation in a play he wrote 
shortly before Twelj/h Night. This play is Julius Caesar, which has no 
hint of a love plot on anyone's part, nor does it imagine self-division by 
creating characters who are, in some sense, aspects of another 
character's mind, as Malvolio and Feste are of Olivia's. Nonetheless, 
Julius Caesar shows us two divided and self-deceived characters-
Caesar himself and his principal competitor, Brutus-and in doing so, 
it comes remarkably close to the moral play in its moral imagining of 
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character. 11 For both of his principal characters, Shakespeare selected 
details from Plutarch and invented others to create decidedly faded 
impressions compared to those in his source. Whereas Plutarch 
proceeds chronologically from Caesar's valiaot young manhood, for 
example, Shakespeare shows us Caesar only in his final days and 
mostly through the eyes of those who are his competitors for power in 
Rome, especially Cassius. Shakespeare invented Cassius's emulous 
description of Caesar's bravado and failure in a swimming contest, his 
near collapse of fever in Spain, aod his deafness. Shakespeare also 
invented Caesar's belief in his wife's barrenness (1.2.6-9), a detail that 
could as easily reflect Caesar's disability as his wife's, though Caesar 
characteristically fails to see the situation that way. 
Shakespeare weakens Caesar physically in several ways in order 
to suggest that his bodily vulnerabilities exemplify and reveal his self-
division and self-deception. The swimming episode is a good example. 
Cassius says Caesar at one time called out pitiably to Cassius to help 
him, but he now treats Cassius as "a wretched creature," who "must 
bend his body I If Caesar carelessly but nod on him" (1.2.117-18). In 
short, Caesar has become so arrogant that he has conveniently forgotten 
what he owes to Cassius, or in other words, he has deceived himself on 
this point. Because Cassius himself is ambitious, and because he is 
trying in this speech to solicit Brutus's aid in the conspiracy, it is 
impossible to know how accurately he is reporting the event, or even if 
it happened at all, but his report of it nonetheless initiates a detracting 
pattern of self-deception in Shakespeare's portrait of Caesar. 
A surprising part of that pattern is Shakespeare's repeated 
suggestion that Caesar has to work hard to suppress fear-a suggestion 
with no hint in Plutarch. 12 On the morning of his assassination, Caesar 
patronizingly tells his wife, Calpumia, that he is not afraid, in response 
to her expressed fear of wonders reported in the streets of Rome: 
Cowards die rnaoy times before their deaths; 
The valiaot never taste of death but once. 
Of all the wonders that I yet have heard, 
It seems to me most strange that men should fear, 
Seeing that death, a necessary end, 
Will come when it will come. (2.2.32-37) 
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The passage may have been inspired by Plutarch's brief comment that 
on the day before his death, when Caesar was discussing with friends 
''what death was best, he preventing their opinions, cried out aloud, 
'Death unlooked for"' (524). In Shakespeare's version, however, 
Caesar has no sooner assured Calpurnia that death holds no fear for him 
than he demands of an entering servant what the augurers have said. In 
other words, Caesar is more afraid of the uncertain future than his bold 
words suggest, and his fear is confirmed by his vacillation about going 
to the senate. Moreover, his declaration to Calpurnia that he is not 
afraid is complemented by three other similar declarations on Caesar's 
part that have no precedent in Plutarch (1.2.198-214, 2.2.10-12, 41-48). 
Repeatedly insisting on one's possession of a particular virtue (in this 
case courage) can be a clue to internal tension over that very virtue, as 
Shakespeare would famously suggest by means of Queen Gertrude in 
the next play he wrote: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks" 
(Hamlet, 3.2.228). Gertrude's perception that the player queen declares 
her fidelity to her husband too strongly is itself a hint of Gertrude's 
own struggle with her conscience regarding her dubious fidelity to old 
Hamlet. 
Shakespeare conveys this kind of self-division and self-deception 
even more strongly for Brutus, Caesar's principal competitor, than for 
Caesar himself. In Brutus's case, the issue is not fear but deep-seated 
agitation that continually disrupts his belief in his own stoic calm, and 
since Brutus is more introspective than Caesar, he often seems more 
than half aware that he is deceiving himself. 13 Early in his conversation 
with Cassius, Brutus frankly acknowledges that he is "vexed ... I ... 
with passions of some difference, I ... Which give some soil, perhaps, 
to my behaviors" ( 1.2.39-42), but as the competition grows keener, and 
events surrounding the assassination become more agitating, he seems 
to suppress this self-insight in favor of expressed belief in his own stoic 
imperturbability. Plutarch again provided the hint in saying that Brutus 
"framed his manners of life by the rules of virtue and study of 
philosophy, and having employed his wit, which was gentle and 
constant, in attempting of great things, methinks he was made and 
framed unto virtue" (813). Plutarch also supplied the suggestion that 
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Brutus did not so consistently practice the stoic virtue of controlling his 
inner turmoil as he wanted to and as he wished others to believe he did: 
He did so frame his countenance and looks, that no man could 
discern he had anything to trouble his mind. But when night 
came that he was in his own house, then he was clean 
changed. For, either care did wake him against his will when 
he would have slept, or else oftentimes of himself he fell into 
such deep thoughts of this enterprise, casting in his mind all 
the dangers that might happen, that his wife lying by him, 
found that there was some marvelous great matter that 
troubled his mind. (823) 
Acting on this intimation, Shakespeare wrote the wakeful night-time 
scene in Brutus's orchard (2.1), when Portia begs him to tell her what is 
troubling him, and he at first denies that anything is. Brutus's refusal to 
listen to his wife is one of many parallels that Shakespeare created 
between Brutus and Caesar in 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, as Norman 
Rabkin points out. 
But Shakespeare goes beyond Plutarch in suggesting that a 
divisive struggle with himself consistently underlies Brutus's fa9ade of 
noble philosophic serenity. The extent of his self-knowledge is the very 
topic raised by Cassius at their first meeting, when Brutus admits to 
being vexed with passion. In spite of this admission, Brutus 
increasingly acts as if his great-souled nobility puts him above every 
human foible, including Caesar's ambition and Cassius's obvious envy 
of Caesar: "I love I The name of honor more than I fear death" (1.2.88-
89). Moreover, he is unaware that his pride in patrician self-possession 
is the very means Cassius is using to persuade him to join the 
conspiracy, as Cassius pointedly remarks to himself when Brutus 
leaves him: "Well, Brutus, thou art noble. Yet I see I Thy honorable 
mettle may be wrought I From that it is disposed" ( 1.2.308-10). 
Cassius's inability to lead the conspiracy without Brutus undoubtedly 
makes Cassius the lesser man of the two, yet Cassius's ability to 
manipulate Brutus by means of Brutus's misplaced confidence in his 
own judgment is a devastating irony in their relationship, and especially 
in Brutus's character, when we first meet the two of them. 
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Sometimes borrowing from Plutarch and sometimes inventing, 
Shakespeare repeatedly shows Brutus overruling Cassius ( often 
disastrously) because of belief in his own superior assessment of every 
situation. Brutus instantly rejects Cassius's urging that the conspirators 
take an oath together, insisting that honesty, virtue, and 
"th 'insuppressive mettle of our spirits" make an oath ignoble (2. l.l 14-
40). Brutus seems not to realize that his harangue against oath-taking is 
an insult to Cassius. and Cassius seems so anxious to retain Brutus's 
approval that he does not object. 14 Brutus overrules Cassius's 
suggestion that Cicero be included in the conspiracy (2.1.150-52), and 
he peremptorily objects to Cassius's urging that Antony be assassinated 
with Caesar: "Our course will seem too bloody, Caius Cassius, I To cut 
the head off and then hack the limbs, I ... Let's be sacrificers, but not 
butchers, Caius" (2.1.163-66). Allowing Antony to live is one of 
Brutus's most momentous political miscalculations, as subsequent 
events make clear, and his insistence that the assassination can 
somehow be a sacred act, when it is in fact a plain political murder, is 
typical of his unresolved division between stoic idealism and the reality 
that constantly agitates him, both externally and internally. 
With no hint from Plutarch, Shakespeare most trenchantly 
explores Brutus's lack of self-knowledge in his quarrel with Cassius 
after the assassination, when they are encamped with their armies near 
Sardis (4.3). 15 Like his original, Shakespeare's Cassius is "choleric" 
and "hot stirring" (Plutarch 819-20, 838), as Brutus is well aware. 
When Cassius objects that Brutus has treated him dishonorably, Brutus 
immediately counters with an accusation that Cassius is dishonest 
(4.3.1-12), thereby speaking either out of obtuse self-righteousness or 
with the design to make Cassius even angrier-or perhaps both. Openly 
priding himself on his patrician self-control, Brutus mocks Cassius for 
his "rash choler" and urges him to "Go show your slaves how choleric 
you are, I And make your bondmen tremble" (4.3.40, 44-45). Thus 
goaded into impotent rage and frustration, Cassius draws his dagger, 
apparently intending to stab Brutus. Seemingly cowed yet again by his 
co-conspirator, however, he demands that Brutus use the dagger against 
him, urging that Brutus might as well kill him in fact, since he is 
already killing him with his words. Brutus replies by ordering Cassius 
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to calm down and then reiterating the difference between them, as he 
sees it: 
Sheathe your dagger. 
Be angry when you will; it shall have scope; 
Do what you will, dishonor shall be humor. 
Oh, Cassius, you are yoked with a lamb 
That carries anger as the flint bears fire, 
Who, much enforced, shows a hasty spark, 
And straight is cold again. (4.3.107-13) 
Brutus uses his fayade of self-restraint to dominate Cassius, though 
apparently without consciously intending to. If Brutus truly cared as 
little for external events as his stoicism counsels him, he would not 
show so much as a hasty spark, but even more, he would not boast of 
his power over himself, nor would he care so deeply to agitate and 
humiliate his co-conspirator, whom he treats as if he were his keenest 
rival. 
The end of the quarrel between these two has been much 
admired-"the contention and reconcilement of Brutus and Cassius is 
universally celebrated," remarked Samuel Johnson as early as 1765 
(8.836)-but the tense resolution actually resolves nothing, because, 
among other things, it confirms Brutus's continued dominance of 
Cassius by Brutus's resourceful insistence on his own moral 
superiority. When Brutus unguardedly admits his inner turmoil-"O 
Cassius, I am sick of many griefs" (4.3.143)--Cassius twits him for his 
stoic inconsistency: "Of your philosophy you make no use, I If you 
give place to accidental evils" (144-45), only to have Brutus come back 
with his hardest-hitting comment thus far: "No man bears sorrow 
better. Portia is dead" (146). Brutus has to know that this information, 
conveyed in this way, will make Cassius completely submissive out of 
concern for him, as in fact it does, and Brutus presses his advantage by 
urging that Cassius "Speak no more of her" (157). Having drawn 
Cassius in with the announcement of Portia's death, Brutus 
immediately shuts him out again by ordering him not to talk about it 
anymore. The two comments in rapid succession keep Cassius off 
balance and maintain Brutus's dominance. Confirming this strategy is 
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Brutus's odd solicitation of news about Portia from the newly-arrived 
Messala-as if Brutus did not already know of her death. 16 When 
Messala reports it, Brutus responds with perfect stoic rectitude: 
Why, farewell, Portia. We must die, Messala. 
With meditating that she must die once, 
I have the patience to endure it now. (4.3.189-91) 
These pious affirmations about himself elicit astonished admiration for 
his godlike endurance from Messala: "Even so great men great losses 
should endure" (192). This is surely the very reaction Brutus had 
counted on, as Geoffrey Miles suggests in his analysis of Brutus's stoic 
constancy as "a genuinely noble ideal which nevertheless rests on 
unnatural suppression of feeling and on 'artful' presence, both directed 
toward satisfying the opinions of others" (143). Cassius makes exactly 
the response to Brutus's effortful pose that Brutus is looking for: "! 
have as much of this in art as you, I But yet my nature could not bear it 
so" ( 4.3.193-94). 
The feelings that Brutus tries to suppress are strong suggestions of 
his self-division, and they are aroused in domestic settings, as well as 
political ones, as Shakespeare makes brilliantly clear in Brutus's 
relationship with the boy Lucius, who has no precedent in Plutarch. 
Lucius is the only person who consistently defers to Brutus, and Lucius 
therefore seems to call forth feelings of solicitude in Brutus that Brutus 
shows to no one else, even his wife, who challenges him to be more 
candid with her (2.1.238 ff.). Yet as a stoic idealist, Brutus believes he 
should give way to no feeling, as the stoic and ex-slave, Epictetus, 
recommends: 
In the case of everything attractive or useful or that you are 
fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, 
beginning with the least little things. If you are fond of a jug, 
say "I am fond of a jug!" For then, when it is broken you will 
not be upset. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you 
are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be 
upset. (12) 
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In keeping with stoic admonition of this sort, Brutus suppresses his 
affection for Lucius with peremptoriness, calling sternly for the lad's 
prompt attention in the small hours of the morning and demanding that 
he fetch a taper (2.1.1-8). When they are encamped near Sardis, Brutus 
shows his ambivalence in a brief scene of extraordinary imaginative 
insight on Shakespeare's part. Brutus again demands the boy's 
attention late at night, insisting that Lucius play his lute while Brutus 
reads. Yet noticing Lucius's tiredness, Brutus is irresistibly drawn to 
care for him: "What? Thou speak'st drowsily! I Poor knave, I blame 
thee not; thou art o'erwatched" (4.3.242-43). When Lucius falls asleep 
while trying to play, Brutus tenderly removes the lute, so Lucius will 
not accidentally damage it (4.3.273-74). 
These gestures of solicitude, however, are accompanied by 
momentary glimpses of Brutus's stoic effort to suppress his affection 
for Lucius with harsh self-control. When Brutus finds a book he had 
been looking for in the pocket of his gown, Lucius's response makes 
clear that Brutus had blamed him for the book's disappearance: "I was 
sure Your Lordship did not give it me" (4.3.256). When Brutus calls 
out, after the ghost's departure, Lucius suddenly wakes, and, assuming 
that Brutus had scolded him, he blames his lute: 'The strings, my lord, 
are false" (4.3.292). Lucius would not instinctively defend himself ifhe 
were not in the habit of needing to, and Brutus seems to treat him with 
alternate tenderness and severity in order to correct the former in 
himself with the latter. As if commenting unconsciously on his own 
actions toward Lucius (to say nothing of Cassius), Brutus urges the 
conspirators: "And let our hearts, as subtle masters do, I Stir up their 
servants to an act of rage I And after seem to chide 'em" (2.1.176-78). 
Perhaps Shakespeare's most important insight from Plutarch 
concerns patrician competitiveness. Caesar and Brutus are the principal 
rivals in Julius Caesar, though by no means the only ones, and 
Shakespeare's incisive characterization of these two as alter egos in 
their stoic ambition and vulnerability is a comment on their aristocratic 
emulation, which motivates all the main characters in Julius Caesar. 
Shakespeare encountered this kind of contest in Plutarch, who tells the 
famous story of the young Alexander's controlling an unmanageable 
horse as an instance of Alexander's fierce rivalry with his father, Philip. 
because Philip had declared the animal to be unbreakable (389-90). In 
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other words, Alexander was determined to conquer something his 
father could not. Plutarch repeats this motif in his story of the young 
Caesar, who wept in frustration when he read of Alexander's deeds, 
because Alexander had conquered so much more than Caesar had at the 
same age (476-77). The parallel episodes point to a similar conception 
of aristocratic warrior rivalry in both Greece and Rome. The difference, 
Gordon Braden argues, is that when Rome's territorial ambition 
produced ever-diminishing returns, the patrician fighter was compelled 
to tum inward for something to conquer, as Plutarch wrote of Caesar, 
whose desire for "glory" made him discontented with what he had 
achieved: "This humour of his was no other but an emulation with 
himself as with another man" (519). This distinctively Roman 
development helps to account for the widespread ideal of stoic 
perfectionism in Roman culture. The stoic sage, Braden concludes, "is 
so far ahead in the competition that he can never be caught" (23). 
Shakespeare seems to have drawn the same conclusion about stoicism 
from his reading and conceivably from what he knew of competition at 
the Elizabethan court, where neo-stoicism was the height of fashion in 
the 1590s (Baker 301-12). 
Shakespeare had a more familiar source, however, than Plutarch 
for the keen sense of self-deception that accompanies patrician 
competition in Julius Caesar. Long before he read Plutarch's Lives, 
Shakespeare had explored in an early satirical comedy, Love's Labor's 
Lost, the way noblemen compete and deceive themselves. In this play, 
four aristocratic young men take an ascetic vow to live in stoic self-
denial for a year, only to find themselves incapable of keeping their 
promise. Shakespeare refers this failure not to classical sources but to 
the Bible. When Berowne catches the King scolding Longaville and 
Longaville scolding Dumaine for doing what each has done himself, 
Berowne exclaims to Longaville: "You found his mote; the King your 
mote did see; I But I a beam do find in each of three" (4.3.157-58). He 
is alluding to an oft-cited biblical statement regarding self-deception in 
Matthew 7.3-5: 
And why sees! thou the mote, that is in thy brothers eye, and 
perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how 
sayest thou to thy brother, Suffer me to cast out the mote out 
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of thine eye, and behold a beam is in thine owne eye? 
Hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and 
then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy 
brother's eye. 17 
Both Love's Labor's Lost and Twe!fth Night allusively acknowledge 
the Christian tradition from which Shakespeare derived his acute sense 
of how people deceive themselves. The idea that Berowne alludes to 
had been influential in centuries of Christian drama before 
Shakespeare, especially the moral play, which used personified 
abstraction to imagine the self as divided against itself in the process of 
temptation. This tradition of dramatizing the inner life underlies 
Brutus's description as "with himself at war" (1.2.46) and Cassius's 
rhetorical question "can you see your face?" (1.2.51), which he goes on 
to explain: 
it is very much lamented, Brutus, 
That you have no such mirrors as will turn 
Your hidden worthiness into your eye, 
That you might see your shadow. (1.2.55-58)18 
Extrapolating from the moral play's use of self-division as necessary to 
the process of self-deception, and alluding again (as he had in Love's 
Labour's Lost) to biblical imagery of sight and self-blindness, 
Shakespeare not only imagines the process at work in Brutus but also 
introduces a clever seducer in Cassius, who explicitly refers to the 
process while he is deceiving a man who is excessively proud of his 
self-knowledge and unusually deceived about its limitations. 
4. Othello 
Given Shakespeare's repeated acknowledgment of precedents for 
the kind of self-deception he revitalizes and re-imagines in his own 
plays, it is worth asking why his continuity with earlier tradition has 
received so little recent critical attention, and here, I think, the 
genealogy of criticism of Othello is instructive. Othello is another play, 
like Twe!fth Night, in which a central character, in this case Othello 
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himself, is divided in consciousness between two other characters in the 
play: Iago and Desdemona. Arthur Kirsch refers this "fertile and 
suggestive" division to the moral play (6), and Spivack long ago traced 
the ambiguities oflago to the standard fixture of Tudor moral plays that 
Feste calls "the old Vice" (Spivack, 3-22, 29-32, 276-77, 432-49). Ann 
Wierum points out that Iago is especially close in strategy to the vice 
called Cloaked Collusion in Skelton's Magnificence (200), suggesting 
Shakespeare's possible debt to this play in still another way. John Velz 
argues that Othello reverses the dynamic of medieval conversion plays 
like the Digby Conversion of St. Paul from the late fifteenth century. 
Whereas St. Paul moves from Jerusalem to Damascus as he undergoes 
a dramatic conversion, Othello moves from Venice to Cyprus as he 
undergoes a tragic Hde-conversion," involving a destructive shift of 
allegiance from his better self to his worse one. 
It is worth noting that the latest date of the criticism just outlined 
is 1981, and that since then very little of the kind has been published. 19 
A principal contributor to the difference was the publication in 1980 of 
Stephen Greenblatt's Renaissance Self-Fashioning, which effectively 
established the critical dominance of postmodern assumptions ( as 
Ricoeur describes them) in Shakespeare studies, to the virtual exclusion 
of other ways of thinking about the plays-including other ways of 
thinking about self-deception in them. Principally to Greenblatt's book, 
for example, can be traced a years-long critical pursuit of how and 
when interiority originated in early modern England.'° "In the early 
sixteenth century," writes Greenblatt, "there is not yet so clearly a fluid, 
continuous inner voice-a dramatic monologue-to be recorded" (86). 
Accepting this claim at face value, critics sought the reason for it in the 
advent of bourgeois culture and the secularization of society in the 
wake of the Protestant reformation. Despite David Aers's whisper in 
the ear of early modernists, no one paid serious attention to precedents 
and especially to Augustine's extended dramatic monologue (it's hard 
to know what else to call it) in the Confessions. Greenblatt quotes 
Augustine (2) on the self from Peter Brown's biography: "Hands off 
yourself. Try to build up yourself, and you build a ruin," as if the 
quotation proves that Augustine had no sense of self to be fashioned. 
Tolle /ege Augustine's Confessions. 
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In Greenblatt's chapter on Othello, the link between a putatively 
innovative subjectivity or interiority and a postmodern conception of 
self-deception is explicit; in fact, one might say that the latter depends 
on the former. The chapter begins by laying out an analogy to Othello 
that Greenblatt eventually explains several pages into the essay (232). 
He evokes a sociologist, Daniel Lerner, and an early New World travel 
writer, Peter Martyr, regarding European explorers' way of 
understanding ( or misunderstanding) the people they encountered in the 
Americas. By improvising a narrative based on another people's 
perception of the world, Europeans tricked those they met in the New 
World into cooperating in their own defeat and destruction. Greenblatt 
describes the European procedure in quasi-Marxist terms of exercising 
power through false consciousness: '~he ownership of another's labor 
conceived as involving no supposedly 'natural' reciprocal obligation 
(as in feudalism) but rather functioning by concealing the very fact of 
ownership from the exploited who believe that they are acting freely 
and in their own interest" (229). 21 The analogy with New World 
exploitation that "seems virtually to force itself upon us," Greenblatt 
continues, is Iago's exploitation of Othello (232). Iago improvises, as 
colonialists did, and he uses his understanding of his intended victim to 
trick him into doing what Iago wants, finally to Othello's self-
destruction. Iago's understanding of Othello's interior life makes his 
victimization of Othello an instance of "submission to narrative self-
fashioning" (234, Greenblatt's emphasis). 
The quasi-Marxist analysis in Greenblatt's argument is 
complemented by a quasi-Freudian analysis of the particular way Iago 
proceeds.22 Citing three Elizabethan theologians (241), Greenblatt 
argues that Protestant Christianity in the sixteenth century had made 
everyone in England believe that sexual pleasure between marriage 
partners was equivalent to adultery. Accordingly, while Othello 
consciously celebrates his romantic attachment to Desdemona, "the 
erotic intensity that informs almost every word is experienced in 
tension" with orthodoxy, so that his language reveals the pressure of 
passion against "the boundary of the orthodox, the strain of its control, 
the potential disruption of its hegemony" (242). To summarize 
Greenblatt's point, Desdemona's passionate attachment to Othello 
makes him unconsciously suspect her of adultery, and this underlying 
suspicion of her is easily exploited by Iago to make Othello suspect her 
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of adultery with others. Simply put, Othello deceives himself in his 
conscious belief that he loves Desdemona; in reality, he subconsciously 
suspects her from the outset. 
My point is not to dispute Greenblatt's analysis but to emphasize 
how exclusively it makes Shakespeare look ahead to postmodern 
conceptions of self-deception, so that the pre-existing ideas of self-
deception I have outlined are left entirely out of account. 23 One does 
not have to moralize Othello to see how it fits patterns of moral self-
deception that appear elsewhere in Shakespeare. If regarded with a 
measure of sympathy, the narrative Othello reports to the Venetian 
Senate of his romance with Desdemona tells us a great deal about his 
inner life, beginning with repeated references to his experience as a 
child soldier (1.3.85, 134, 159-60). Though he speaks descriptively, not 
self-pityingly, the experience he refers to was presumably 
involuntary-as a captive, for example-since he fetched his life and 
being from men of royal siege (1.2.21-22), who would not have 
exposed a seven-year-old prince to the hazards of combat. The detail 
adds poignancy to the story he tells later about the handkerchief, which 
has assumed talismanic proportions in his mind because it is a unique 
physical remnant of his lost childhood: his mother gave it to him as she 
was dying (3.4.65). In addition to child soldiering, his narrative 
includes his enduring a lifetime of endless hardship ("little of this great 
world can I speak I More than pertains to feats of broils and battle" 
[1.3.88-89)), and his having learned to endure by means of long-
cultivated stoicism: 
The tyrant custom, most grave senators, 
Hath made the flinty and steel couch of war 
My thrice-driven bed of down. I do agnize 
A natural and prompt alacrity 
I find in hardness ... (1.3.232-36) 
Othello as stoic fits a conception of self-deception based on an 
elevated idea of one's self-control that Shakespeare had explored 
satirically in comedy, beginning with Love's Labor's lost, and 
politically in Julius Caesar, and that he would go on to explore 
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tragically again in Coriolanus.24 Bernard McElroy points out that 
Othello's alacrity in hardness is complemented by a characteristic stoic 
credence in ''unknown fate" (2.1.192), and that this "belief in a 
malignant fate and pitiless heavens is quite consistent with the life of 
broil and battle he has endured," in that Othello "imposes emotional 
distance between himself and his dreadful experiences," thereby 
achieving a remarkable "imperturbability, a stoic patience and absolute 
self-confidence never more majestically in effect than when we first see 
him" (124).25 "Keep up your bright swords, for the dew will rust them" 
(1.2.60) is a striking expression of the "perfect soul" (1.2.31) on which 
Othello has learned to rely in threatening situations-including the 
situation in which he finds himself as a north African in a hostile and 
racist Italian society that nonetheless depends on him for his 
extraordinary military skill: ''the state," as Iago points out to Roderigo, 
"cannot with safety cast him" (l.1.151-53) and therefore tolerates 
him.26 To fall unabashedly in love with a noble white woman in these 
circumstances is to confront the racist threat about as boldly as one can. 
To fall in love, however, is to abandon self-control, as Othello has 
done-presumably for the first time in his life-when we first meet 
him. He remembers being captivated by Desdemona's sympathy for his 
youthful distress: "I did consent, I And often did beguile her of her 
tears I When I did speak of some distressful stroke I That my youth 
suffered" (1.3.157-60). Her identification with his suffering-her 
"pity"-is what Othello repeatedly emphasizes, with complete 
frankness, in acknowledging that he fell in love with her (163, 170).27 
In complementary fashion, she fell in love with him for his magnificent 
self-command, in spite of the suffering his life had imposed on him. 
"She wished I That heaven had made her such a man," reports Othello 
(1.3.163-64), and shortly thereafter she confirms his report: 
I saw Othello's visage in his mind, 
And to his honors and his valiant parts 
Did I my soul and fortunes consecrate. (1.3.255-57) 
Her love for Othello and his for her require a major voluntary breach of 
his stoic self-discipline-a willing and joyful surrender to deep and 
overwhelming feeling that he had always resisted before in order 
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literally to preserve his life. Repeated references to his childhood speak 
directly to his recovery of emotional freedom and innocence that he had 
long contained and that Desdemona helped him recover (Kirsch 23-25). 
Desdemona thus enters Othello's life both as a kind of grace-turning 
him around in a way that he had never imagined possible-and 
simultaneously as an entirely benign threat to his "perfect soul."28 
If his "conversion" happens in Venice, as Velz points out, his "de-
conversion" in Cyprus happens very swiftly in 3.3, and it is directly 
linked to the fragility of his stoic self-conception in at least two ways. 
First, deeply convinced from a lifetime of experience that surrendering 
to passion is the greatest threat to his self-preservation, Othello 
responds all too credulously to Iago's "honest" suspicion, and in light 
of it he tries to fall back on the resource that has sustained him through 
previous threats and hardship-his stoic imperturbability: "Away at 
once with love or jealousy" (3.3.206); "All my fond love thus do I blow 
to heaven. I 'Tis gone" (3.3.460-61); "My heart is turned to stone; I 
strike it, and it hurts my hand" (4.1.184-85). No matter how important 
his stoic reserve may have been to his self-preservation in the past, 
however, he cannot recover it where Desdemona is concerned: no 
sooner has he struck his stony heart in a gesture of determined self-
control than he groans aloud, "Oh, the world hath not a sweeter 
creature! She might lie by an emperor's side, and command him tasks" 
(4.1.185-87). His self-division is palpable, and it points directly to self-
deception about the extent of his stoic control, now that his love for 
Desdemona has overwhelmed his inner defenses. His attempt to deal 
with the latest perceived threat to himself peremptorily and with perfect 
self-control-in short, in the same way he has dealt with every other 
threat-therefore inevitably fails, because he is not the same person he 
was. He not only sees Desdemona as a threat he cannot overcome but 
also sees himself in reductively racist terms as the monster that 
Venetians have always imagined him to be (Kirsch 30-34). Othello 
recognizes his own collapse in a passage of agonized self-analysis in 
which he recalls threats of both literal destruction and social rejection: 
Had it pleased heaven 
To try me with affliction, had they rained 
All kinds of sores and shames on my bare head, 
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Steeped me in poverty to the very lips, 
Given to captivity me and my utmost hopes, 
I should have found in some place ofmy soul 
A drop of patience. But, alas, to make me 
The fixed figure for the time of scorn 
To point his slow unmoving finger at! 
Yet could I bear that too, well, very well. 
But there where I have garnered up my heart, 
Where either I must live or bear no life, 
The fountain from the which my current runs 
Or else dries up----to be discarded thence! 
Or keep it as a cistern for foul toads 
To knot and gender in! Tum thy complexion there, 
Patience, thou young and rose-lipped cherubin-
Ay, there look grim as hell! (4.2.49-66) 
Shakespeare had explored a similar spectacle of tragic self-
division in Julius Caesar, where the strains of maintaining stoic control 
reveal themselves at every tum in Brutus, and Shakespeare would 
explore Roman self-division again, even more trenchantly, in 
Coriolanus. But Othello is not a Roman play, and Shakespeare does 
something with Othello's "de-conversion" that he does nowhere else: 
he tells Othello's story in such a way that Othello discovers the 
absolute trustworthiness of the faith that had delivered him from the 
need for stoic self-control only after he has destroyed the source of that 
faith. "The tragic irony of this play is that truth can be believed only 
after it has lost its power to save and has assumed devastating power to 
torment" (McElroy 133). Shakespeare links the torment of Othello's 
soul with salvation history in the language of damnation that Othello 
uses to describe himself, when the horrific truth of what he has done is 
finally clear to him: 
.................... 0 ill-starred wench! 
Pale as thy smock! When we shall meet at compt, 
This look of thine will hurl my soul from heaven, 
And fiends will snatch at it. Cold, cold, my girl? 
Even like thy chastity. Oh, cursed, cursed slave! 
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Whip me, ye devils, 
From the possession of this heavenly sight! 
Blow me about in winds! Roast me in sulfur! 
Wash me in steep-down gulfs ofliquid fire! 
Oh, Desdemon! Dead, Desdemon! Dead! Oh! Oh! 
(5.2.281-90) 
This tormented conviction of himself as damned reinforces the 
"conversion" that he underwent in Venice. The division of himself 
between Iago and Desdemona is revealed to him in such a terrible way 
that the revelation itself is unrelieved torture, and Othello experiences it 
as damnation because it marks the loss of the transforming effect that 
Desdemona had had in his life, coming to him so unexpectedly and 
with such unanticipated deliverance of himself from himself that she 
might indeed have been grace itself. 
The second reason for Othello's rapid de-conversion is Iago, who 
understands Othello's self-division and uses it to destroy him, thus 
taking Cassius's strategy with Brutus to new lows of strategic 
manipulation.29 Iago commends Othello's stoic reserve to Emilia and 
Desdemona in feigned surprise that sardonically undercuts what it 
confirms: 
Can he be angry? I have seen the cannon 
When it hath blown his ranks into the air, 
And like the devil from his very arm 
Puffed his own brother-and is he angry? (3.4.136-39) 
After Othello collapses with the agony of struggling vainly to regain his 
lost composure, Iago twits him with the loss of it, even as he sets up the 
next assault on it: "Whilst you were here o'erwhelmed with your 
grief- I A passion most unsuiting such a man- I Cassio came hither" 
(4.1.78-80). As an emulous officer, a self-hating racist, and a 
misogynist, Iago represents these things in Othello himself, and Iago 
readily understands that Othello is inclined to trust a fellow officer 
before any woman he has ever met. Iago uses this trust in him, ''honest 
Iago," to erode Othello's trust in Desdemona in innumerable ways, 
finally equating her in Othello's mind with a flirt like Bianca, so that 
87 
Cox 
Othello will perceive Desdemona as a treacherous threat to himself, 
rather than the source of his liberation from a lifelong habit of imposed 
self-control. Shakespeare lets us hear enough of Iago's thoughts to 
know that Iago himself is not subject to stoic self-deception, because he 
controls himself in nothing except in deceiving others, yet his 
consuming envy of Othello's moral superiority is evident in a revealing 
comment about Othello--"The Moor ... is of a constant, loving, noble 
nature" (2.1.289-90)-and in another about Cassio, a much lesser man 
than Othello: "He hath a daily beauty in his life I That makes me ugly" 
(5.1.19-20). 
Iago's strategy is all too successful, and it is undoubtedly based, 
as Greenblatt argues, on Iago's understanding of the man he strives to 
control and betray. Finding New World analogies to Iago's strategy ties 
it to sixteenth-century innovation and therefore makes it seem 
definitively and wholly new in European experience. As Spivack 
argues, however, Shakespeare refers Iago to centuries of dramaturgy 
that involved moral self-division and self-deceit on the English stage, 
acknowledging a native theatrical tradition generously, even as he gives 
it powerful and unforgettable new life on the London stage. "Double-
dealing and I be all one," boasts Cloaked Collusion in Magnificence; 
"Crafting and hafting contrived is by me" (696-97). Moreover, he bases 
his craftiness on what he knows of his victims' moods: 
When other men laugh then study I and muse, 
Devising the means and ways that I can 
How I may hurt and hinder every man. 
"Every man" is generic, of course, and Othello is specific, but his 
tormentor nonetheless proceeds according to well-established theatrical 
precedent: 
And craftily can I grope how every man is minded. 
To flatter and to fiery is all my pretence, 
Among all such persons as I well understand 
Be light of belief and hasty of credence; 
I make them to startle and sparkle like a brand; 
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I move them, I maze them, I make them so fond 
That they will hear no man but the first tale; 
And so by these means I brew much bale. (725-44)3° 
The bale brewed by Iago is based on exactly the same strategy as 
Cloaked Collusion's: tricking a victim into self-destruction by means of 
what the tricker understands about the victim's own soul. Skelton's 
character is satirical and topical; Shakespeare's, terrifying and sublime: 
but both playwrights draw unabashedly on a shared sense of 
humankind's destiny, evident in Othello in Iago's repeated allusions to 
hell and in Othello's belief in his own damnation for what he has done 
to Desdemona. Elizabethan belief in that destiny may well have been 
hegemonic, as Greenblatt asserts, but it was not uniquely Protestant, 
and England's official church was far from exercising total mind 
control~much as it may have wished to. Skelton, after all, was a pre-
Reformation playwright, and the dramatic tradition on which he and 
Shakespeare both drew was shaped by centuries of late medieval 
theology and before that by Christian thinking going back to St. Paul. 
Attending to what Shakespeare himself generously acknowledged in 
his dramatic heritage would seem to be an appropriate critical 
procedure, without exclusively privileging what we have learned most 
recently. The freshest things now reigning sometimes stale most 
quickly, as the Chorus of Time recognizes in The Winter's Tale. The 
wiser course might therefore be not to accord them our only attention. 
Hope College 
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Notes 
*I am grateful to Alan Dessen for reading a draft of this essay and to 
Cynthia Valk for inviting me to present a preliminary version of the 
argument at the 44"' International Congress on Medieval Studies, 
Western Michigan University, in May, 2009. 
I As Alan Dessen argues, "moral play" or simply "morall" was the 
term used by Shakespeare's contemporaries to refer to what has since 
been called the "morality play" (Dessen, Shakespeare and the Late 
Moral Plays 11-13). He points out that a lost play called "A morall of 
Cloth breeches and velvet hose" was in the Chamberlain's Men's 
repertory as late as 1600 (12-13), and that a rival company, Pembroke's 
Men, performed one of the plays Dessen discusses, Ulpian Fulwell's 
Like Will to Like (1562-68), as late as 1600 (Dessen 163; Henslowe 
164). Another such play, The Seven Deadly Sins, now extant only in 
assigned players' parts, still belonged to the Chamberlain's Men in 
1597-98 (Kathman). 
2 On self-division in The Confessions, see Brian Stock 104-05, 
229, 255. 
3 The difference is that Augustine was drawn to Paul's suggestion 
of inward struggle, whereas Prudentius was more interested in Paul's 
metaphors of spiritual warfare (Smith 127-29, 139-40). 
4 As Dessen points out, the moral plays that registered most 
strongly with Shakespeare and his contemporaries no longer retained 
the feature of a divided principal character (Shakespeare and the Late 
Moral Plays 21-22), which is more typical of pre-Reformation moral 
plays. Dessen also acknowledges, however, that the features he 
identifies were not present in all the plays he discusses (36), and 
memories were long, as Dessen notes in the case of R. Willis, who 
vividly remembered a moral play from his youth when he was an old 
man (35). Dessen suggests that the late moral plays may have been seen 
rather than read (162), and it is worth adding that acting traditions 
would have remained alive even longer for performers than for their 
auditors. 
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5 Mike W. Martin's analysis of self-deception and morality is 
written with nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinking principally in 
mind, so its applicability to the moral play is limited. 
6 Cox 99-103. The device referred to appears in none of the late 
moral plays Dessen discusses, and it was original with Skelton: 
Character A, who is vicious, ingratiates himself with Character B, who 
is decent, advising him that he risks the displeasure of Character C, 
their mutual superior. Offering to intervene with C on B's behalf, A in 
fact slanders B to C in such a way as to bring about the displeasure he 
had claimed to fear. In Magnificence the triangle involves Cloaked 
Collusion, Measure, and Magnificence, and the best known such 
triangle in Shakespeare is Iago, Cassio, and Othello, but variations on 
this triangle appear in the other plays by Shakespeare listed above. 
7 All quotations from Shakespeare are from the edition by David 
Bevington. 
8 Dessen is especially good on critical myopia regarding the late 
moral plays (1-10). For an unusual, if not unique, example of a critic 
who refers both backward (to medieval religious drama) and forward 
(to Freud), see Kirsch 1-9. 
9 The lines I'm referring to in Time's speech are those that seem 
most self-reflexive (that is, reflexive on the playwright): 
Let me pass 
The same I am ere ancient' st order was 
Or what is now received. I witness to 
The times that brought them in; so shall I do 
To th' freshest things now reigning, and make stale 
The glistering of this present as my tale 
Now seems to it. ... (Winter's Tale, 4.1.9-15) 
10 Twelfth Night stages no Vice, but this stock character had 
become such a standard feature of the moral play by the late sixteenth 
century that "Vice" was virtually metonymous for "moral play" 
(Dessen, Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays 18-22). 
11 Norman Rabkin was the first to note substantial parallels 
between Brutus and Caesar in Julius Caesar. 
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12 Georg Gervinus noticed this point as early as 1883: Caesar 
"speaks so much of having no fear, that by this very thing he betrays 
his fear" (720), and M. W. Maccallum commented in 1910 that 
Caesar's fear of supernatural signs suggests "a touch of self-deception 
as well as of superstition in Caesar, and this self-deception reappears in 
other more important matters," such as Caesar's repeated insistence 
that he is not afraid (220-21 ). 
13 The issue of Brutus's stoicism has been inconclusively debated. 
See John Anson, Miles 125-27, Gilles Monsarrat 139-44, and Marvin 
L. Vawter. Plutarch remarks that of all the Greek philosophers, Brutus 
"loved Plato's sect best" (814), but the stoics drew heavily on Plato's 
descriptions of Socrates's amazing self-control. They argued that one 
can do nothing to change events, which happen according to destiny, so 
one needs to control feelings, desires, and wishes in response to events, 
as Socrates does when anticipating his own death in the Phaedo. 
14 Plutarch reports that the conspirators took no oath, but he says 
they were all agreed on the matter, reporting no conflict between 
Cassius and Brutus (822). 
15 Plutarch reports the quarrel (843), but Shakespeare's 
interpretation of it is entirely his own. 
16 The double announcement of Portia's death has long been 
considered a textual crux in Julius Caesar, though the evidence 
adduced for it as a problem has been strongly challenged. For a 
summary of the issues, see Wells and Taylor 387. For another 
interpretation that ignores the presumed crux, as mine does, see Miles 
143. 
17 Horace offers a close parallel to the saying in Matthew in Satire 
I.iii.25-27: "When you look over your own sins, your eyes are rheumy 
and daubed with ointment; why, when you view the failings of your 
friends, are you as keen of sight as an eagle or as a serpent of 
Epidaurus?" If Shakespeare knew both the classical and biblical 
sayings, as seems likely, he clearly chose one over the other. 
18 Cassius's argument uses the same imagery of sight that John 
Davies uses in Nosce Teipsum to describe self-deception as a fact of 
fallen human nature, and Davies's editor speculates (331) that 
Shakespeare drew on these lines in Julius Caesar: 
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Is it because the mind is like the eye, 
(Through which it gathers knowledge by degrees) 
Whose rays reflect not, but spread outwardly, 
Not seeing itself, when other things it sees? (105-08) 
It would seem more likely that both Davies and Shakespeare were 
drawing on well-known biblical imagery, noted abave. 
19 Even Kirsch's book, published in 1981, is mostly a collection of 
revised essays he had published earlier in other forms. Alan Dessen is 
an important exception to the relative neglect of Shakespeare's 
medieval dramatic heritage, and Dessen's forthcoming book pays 
particular attention to that heritage from a performance standpoint. 
2
° Katherine Maus helpfully summarizes the discussion, beginning 
with Catherine Belsey, and contributes substantially to it herself (1-34). 
More recently the topic has been addressed by Hugh Grady 1-25, I 09-
25. 
21 
"Quasi-" is intended here descriptively, not dismissively, to 
refer to Greenblatt's approximation of a set of ideas, using their 
language and general schemes but without citing sources or particular 
theoreticians. Greenblatt's "cultural poetics" has deliberately been less 
precise and source-oriented than its counterpart in Britain, "cultural 
materialism." 
22 Greenblatt acknowledges his indebtedness to two other readings 
of Othello, by Stanley Cavell and Arthur Kirsch respectively, that are 
more or less Freudian (298nl5, 306n66). 
23 Greenblatt cites Spivack once on Othello only to dismiss his 
argument (305-06n63). 
24 T. S. Eliot's dislike of Othello prompted him to argue that 
stoicism is satirical in Othello as well. For a discussion of stoic self-
division in Coriolanus, see Cox, 176-81. 
25 McElroy (122) points to two other references to "fate" by 
Othello (3.4.66 and 5.2.274). I would add Othello's reference to 
"destiny unshunnable, like death" (3.3.291) and "ill-starred wench" 
(5.2.281). 
26 Recognizing racism is a twentieth-century innovation and 
therefore even more recent than the forefathers of postmodern.ism. I 
invoke it deliberately, nonetheless, in an analysis of what Shakespeare 
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might have learned from his own experience, because Shakespeare was 
keenly responsive to social outsiders-probably because he was a 
social outsider himself. Shylock and Caliban come immediately to 
mind, but Aaron the Moor in Titus Andronicus is an important early 
example. 
27 Kirsch is especially good on Othello's use of"pity" (13-14). 
28 The ambivalonce of Othello's love for Desdemona is noticed by 
both Cavel! and Greenblatt, who attribute it in various ways to 
Othello's inability to believe that Desdemona can be both passionate 
and a faithful wife. 
29 Iago as Vice has little about him of the merry jesting figure the 
Vice had largely become by the late sixteenth century (Dessen, 
Shakespeare and the Late Moral Plays 18). In framing Iago, 
Shakespeare reverted to an earlier tradition, represented by the likes of 
Cloaked Collusion in Skelton's Magnificence. Iago's destruction of 
Othello is a variation of the pattern Skelton originated (above, n. 6). 
30 Paula Neuss's gloss of line 743 describes Othello precisely: 
'1hey will not believe the truth, once they have been told a lie." 
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